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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COULD TUSKEGEE HAPPEN TODAY?
JERRY MENIKOFF*
The federally financed Tuskegee Study of African American men with
syphilis casts a long shadow on the conduct of research involving human
subjects in the United States. Even seventy-five years after the study began
and thirty-five years after it was publicly exposed by an enterprising
reporter,1 overstating its impact remains difficult. In 1997, while issuing a
formal apology to the eight remaining survivors of the study, President
Clinton characterized the study with these words:
[These survivors] are a living link to a time not so very long ago that many
Americans would prefer not to remember, but we dare not forget. It was a
time when our nation failed to live up to its ideals, when our nation broke
the trust with our people that is the very foundation of our democracy. It is
not only in remembering that shameful past that we can make amends and
repair our nation, but it is in remembering that past that we can build a
better present and a better future.2

The spectacle of federal researchers standing by and watching hundreds of
poor black men suffer the ravages of syphilis while denying them
information about a newly discovered treatment had a profound effect on

* Director, Office of Human Subjects Research, and Bioethicist, Department of Bioethics,
National Institutes of Health; Associate Professor of Law, Ethics & Medicine, University of
Kansas (on leave). The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the policy of the National Institutes of Health or the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. I am grateful to Robert Levine and Phil Rubin for engaging with me in a
debate about these issues during The Great Debate: The Tension Between IRB Review and
Academic Freedom/the First Amendment, conducted at the Public Responsibility in Medicine &
Research (PRIM&R) 2007 Annual Human Research Protection Program Conference held on
December 3, 2007 in Boston, Massachusetts.
1. See Remembering Tuskegee: Syphilis Study Still Provokes Disbelief, Sadness, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO, July 25, 2002, www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/jul/tuskegee/
(last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter NPR, Remembering Tuskegee] (describing Associated
Press reporter Jean Heller’s July 25, 1972 story that exposed the study).
2. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President
in Apology for Study Done in Tuskegee (May 16, 1997), at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/
New/Remarks/Fri/19970516-898.html (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter Presidential
Apology].
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the development of rules to ensure that no such “shameful” episode could
happen again in the United States.
Given this past experience, it is more than somewhat surprising to
discover that leaders and academics at the highest and most respected
levels are supporting regulatory reforms and interpretations that would, in
effect, allow modern-day researchers to conduct studies that could duplicate
in large part the core wrongs that took place in the Tuskegee Study.
Specifically, these movements would lead to a particular and relatively
narrow interpretation of the duties that a researcher owes to research
subjects. Thus far, these movements have not highlighted their possible
impact on allowing Tuskegee-like studies to take place. This Article explains
that impact and brings greater awareness to these important changes that
have been taking place largely under the radar.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the facts of the Tuskegee Study
and the federal regulations its disclosure prompted. Part II describes the
recent initiative to revise the regulations to lessen their impact on certain
types of so-called low-risk research based on the allegation that, among
other things, the current regulations violate the First Amendment. Part III
describes the recent debate about the conduct of certain types of public
health studies and the issues that debate has highlighted regarding the
duties owed by researchers to research subjects. Part IV demonstrates the
impact that both of these developments would have on modern-day
researchers’ ability to conduct a Tuskegee-like study and explores whether
these developments are acceptable in our society. The Article concludes
that the regulatory system is far from perfect and should be reformed to
minimize wasted efforts and avoid the creation of unnecessary barriers to
conducting research while still recognizing the important basic duties to
disclose risks, including those not created by the researchers, to research
subjects.
I. THE TUSKEGEE STUDY AND THE PATH TO THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The Tuskegee Study began in 1932, when researchers at the U.S. Public
Health Service partnered with the Tuskegee Institute to learn more about the
natural pathology of syphilis.3 The disease had long been referred to as
“the great mimic” because it has the ability to imitate the symptoms of many
other diseases.4 Its symptoms change over the course of long periods of

3. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE SYPHILIS STUDY
TUSKEGEE: THE TUSKEGEE TIMELINE (2008), at www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm (last
visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter TUSKEGEE TIMELINE].
4. LOIS N. MAGNER, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 227 (2nd ed. 2005); CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC FACT SHEET: SYPHILIS, at WHAT IS SYPHILIS? (2007), available at

AT
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time, producing three distinct stages of infection: primary, secondary, and
late or latent.5 Accordingly, when the study began, researchers had very
good reasons to want to learn more about the consequences of being
infected with syphilis.
The study enrolled 399 black men who had latent syphilis and 201
black men without the disease to serve as the control group.6 The subjects
were told merely that they had “bad blood,” and at no time during the
decades-long study were those infected with the disease ever informed that
they had syphilis.7 The government physicians conducting the study went to
great lengths to ensure that no one who interacted with the subjects told
them they had syphilis.8 One reason for withholding that information was to
minimize the likelihood that the subjects would obtain treatment for the
disease.9 Even when the study began, researchers knew that existing
treatments, such as the use of arsenic compounds, could substantially
reduce symptoms.10 Furthermore, beginning in the 1940s, the medical
community determined that penicillin therapy was an even more effective
treatment. However, that treatment was also withheld.11
On July 25, 1972, Associated Press reporter Jean Heller brought the
study massive public exposure.12 Major newspapers throughout the nation

www.cdc.gov/std/syphilis/syphilis-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter CDC
FACT SHEET].
5. See CDC FACT SHEET, supra note 4 (describing the symptoms of each stage).
6. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
STUDY AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL 12 (1973) (quoting VENEREAL DISEASE BRANCH, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE TUSKEGEE STUDY (1972)),
available at www.research.usf.edu/cs/library/docs/finalreport-tuskegeestudyadvisorypanel.pdf
(last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
7. TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, supra note 3.
8. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 5 (1993) (stating
that “neither the interns nor the subjects knew what the study involved”). CARL H. COLEMAN ET
AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 41 (2005) (quoting and
describing various accounts of the study and the information withheld from the subjects); FINAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 14; TUSKEGEE TIMELINE, supra note 3.
9. JONES, supra note 8, at 5; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 14; TUSKEGEE TIMELINE,
supra note 3.
10. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. In 1932, existing data showed that 35% of
untreated patients with late latent syphilis were disease-free and in good health, compared to
85% of those who had received treatment. Id. (citing Joseph Earle Moore et al., Cooperative
Clinical Studies in the Treatment of Syphilis: Latent Syphilis, 13 VENEREAL DISEASE INFO. 317,
379 (1932)).
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12; see also NPR, Remembering Tuskegee, supra
note 1.
12. NPR, Remembering Tuskegee, supra note 1.
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quickly picked up her article.13 As part of the fallout from the exposure, the
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) made a public pledge “to investigate
the circumstances surrounding” the study.14 In fulfilling that pledge, the
Assistant Secretary, only two months later, established the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel to investigate several issues.15 The ninemember committee was asked to determine: (1) whether the study was
justified at the time it began and whether it should have been continued
after penicillin became widely available (in the 1950s); (2) whether the study
should be continued, and, if not, how to best terminate it in a way that
respected the participants; and (3) “whether existing policies to protect the
rights of patients participating in health research conducted or supported by
[HEW were] adequate and effective” and, if necessary, what improvements
could be implemented.16
The panel’s conclusions on the final issue, which it released in a 1973
report, were rather damning of the then-existing policies to protect human
research subjects:
[T]he Tuskegee Syphilis Study, despite its widespread publicity was not an
isolated phenomenon. We believe that the revelations from Macon County
merely brought to the surface once again the unresolved problems which
have long plagued medical research activities. Indeed, we hasten to add
that although we refer in this report almost exclusively to physicians and to
biomedical investigations, the issues we explore also arise in the context of
non-medical investigations with human beings, conducted by psychologists,
sociologists, educators, lawyers and others. . . .
Our initial determination that the protection of human research subjects
is a current and widespread problem should not be surprising, especially in
light of the recent Congressional hearings and bills focusing on the
regulation of experimentation. In the past decade the press has publicized
and debated a number of experiments which raised ethical questions: for
example, the injection of cancer cells into aged patients at the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, the deliberate infection of mentally
retarded children with hepatitis at Willowbrook, the development of heart
transplantation techniques, the enormous amount of drug research
conducted in American prisons, the whole-body irradiation treatment of

13. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at 1 [hereinafter Heller, Syphilis Victims Untreated]; Jean Heller,
U.S. Testers Let Many Die of Syphilis, WASH. POST, July 26, 1972, at A1 [hereinafter Heller,
U.S. Testers].
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1; see also Special, H.E.W. Will Study Syphilis Project,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1972, at 40.
15. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 41-42; see also Special, supra note 14.
16. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 1; see also Special, supra note 14.
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cancer patients at the University of Cincinnati, the advent and spread of
“psychosurgery,” and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study itself.17

The panel proceeded to provide a comprehensive critique of the many holes
in the then-existing federal regulatory system for protecting research
subjects.18
Within a year of the report, Congress passed the National Research Act
of 1974 that created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.19 The Commission
authored The Belmont Report, which provides the foundation for the
regulations the government subsequently adopted for protecting research
subjects.20 Thus, the current regulatory system for protecting research
subjects owes a great deal to the government’s response to the disclosure of
what happened in the Tuskegee Study.21
The current system is largely based on a set of federal regulations,22 the
core section of which is called the “Common Rule” because most federal
agencies that fund human subject research have adopted identical versions
of it.23 These regulations apply to most human subject research funded by
the federal government and also have substantial influence over much
research that is not government funded.24 At the heart of the rules are a set
of requirements that researchers must meet before conducting a study
involving human subjects. In particular, the proposed subjects must receive
17. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
18. Id. at 29-37.
19. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 201,
available at http://history.nih.gov/01docs/historical/documents/PL93-348.pdf (last visited
May 19, 2008).
20. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RES.,
THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, available at www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/AC/05/briefing/20054178b_09_02_Belmont%20Report.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter BELMONT
REPORT].
21. For a comprehensive timeline of legislation and regulations involving human subjects,
see Joel Sparks, Historical Resources: Timeline of Laws Related to the Protection of Human
Subjects, National Institutes of Health, (June 2002), at http://history.nih.gov/01Docs/
historical/2020b.htm (last visited May 19, 2008).
22. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2007), available at www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm (last visited May 19, 2008).
23. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 106. Sixteen agencies have adopted these
regulations. Sparks, supra note 21. Subpart A of 45 C.F.R. Part 46, the so-called Common
Rule, contains the Department of Health and Human Services’ basic policy for protection of
human research subjects.
24. Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 406-07, 441 (2007).
For guidance on the interpretation of 45 C.F.R. Part 46, see OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OHRP 45 CFR PART 46 FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (FAQS), at www.hhs.gov/ohrp/45CFRpt46faq.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
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adequate information so that they can make informed choices about
whether to participate and can only be enrolled in a study after freely and
voluntarily providing their informed consent.25 In addition, the balance
between the risks to the subjects and the benefits to the subjects and society
from conducting the study must be appropriate.26
This regulatory system’s administrative structure is somewhat unusual in
that an entity called an institutional review board (IRB), composed of at least
five members with various backgrounds,27 is required to review and
determine whether a study conforms with the regulations.28 While most
major research institutions in the United States have one or more IRBs,
researchers can also hire independent IRBs.29 Every year in the United
States, thousands of IRBs review many thousands of research studies.30
Consistent with the previously quoted conclusions from the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel’s 1973 Report that biomedical
research is not the only potentially problematic type of research,31 the
regulations are not limited to a particular type of research. They include a
broad definition of what constitutes “research” and of when research
involves “human subjects.”32 On the other hand, the regulations do
recognize that not all research requires the same level of scrutiny.33 Thus,
certain types of research, such as most research involving surveys or
questionnaires, is exempt from most of the requirements.34 Instead, such
low-risk research is merely required to comply with the less-specific ethical
principles embodied in The Belmont Report.35
25. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also JERRY MENIKOFF WITH EDWARD P. RICHARDS, WHAT THE
DOCTOR DIDN’T SAY: THE HIDDEN TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL RESEARCH 8, 85, 96-97 (2006).
26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2); MENIKOFF, supra note 25, at 51-60.
27. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
28. See id. § 46.103(b).
29. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS 3 (1998), available at
www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00192.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008).
30. Id. at i, 4.
31. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that issues involving human subjects
research “also arise in the context of non-medical investigations with human beings,
conducted by psychologists, sociologists, educators, lawyers and others”).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d), (f); see also MENIKOFF, supra note 25, at 24-36.
33. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (outlining “[e]xpedited review procedures for certain kinds of
research involving no more than minimal risk”); see also Jerry Menikoff, Where’s the Law?:
Uncovering the Truth about IRBs and Censorship, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 791 (2007) (arguing that
because many research studies fall into regulatory categories that are either subject to cursory
review or not subject to review at all, the IRB system should pose minimal burden on these
researchers in the majority of cases).
34. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b).
35. See Menikoff, supra note 33, at 795-96 (describing the Belmont Report’s reference to
basic ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice).
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II. DISSATISFACTION WITH IRB “MISSION CREEP” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGE TO THE REGULATIONS
For various reasons, in recent years both the visibility and impact of the
federal regulations have increased. The primary reason is the sudden burst
in enforcement of the regulations by the federal Office for Protection from
Research Risks (OPRR) between 1998 and 2000.36 This upswing in
regulatory action likely was motivated, at least in part, by a June 1998
report from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of
Health and Human Services.37 The OIG report concluded that the system
for protecting research subjects was in serious trouble, largely because IRBs
were having a difficult time fulfilling their responsibilities.38 As the report
stated, the “effectiveness of IRBs is in jeopardy.”39 Among the reasons for
that conclusion were that (1) the research environment had changed
dramatically from the classic model of a single investigator performing a
study on her own; (2) IRBs were required to take on increased workloads,
with pressures to approve studies quickly; (3) IRBs were paying insufficient
attention to the annual “continuing review” required of previously approved
studies; (4) IRBs were subject to growing conflicts of interest as institutional
pressures to conduct research grew; (5) IRB members and staffs received
relatively little training; and (6) neither IRBs nor the Department of Health
and Human Services had a system for evaluating how effectively the IRBs
actually protect human subjects.40
In October 1998, OPRR took the first of several high-profile
enforcement actions, suspending research at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s
Medical Center in Chicago.41 During the subsequent two years, OPRR
brought enforcement actions against a number of prominent institutions,
most notably Duke University and the University of Pennsylvania.42 Since
2001, after OPRR’s reorganization that gave it greater independence and
renamed it the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), the level of
such enforcement actions has dropped back to the pre-1998 level.43
Nonetheless, the short burst of activity was sufficient to put the human
research protections program on the radar screens of most institutions that
36. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 57-58.
37. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM (June 1998), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/
oei-01-97-00193.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter OIG, TIME FOR REFORM]; see
also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 57.
38. OIG, TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 37, at 4-9.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 4-9.
41. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 58.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 60-61.
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conduct substantial amounts of human subject research. As a result,
institutions have increased internal compliance activities and have made
greater efforts to encourage researchers to be aware of and comply with the
rules.44
Given that the regulations apply not solely to biomedical research, this
increased compliance activity soon percolated down to what are generally
perceived as the relatively low-risk types of studies, namely those in
behavioral and social science. Over time, various anecdotal reports began
circulating among researchers in those fields, suggesting that IRBs would
occasionally impose burdensome requirements on researchers.45 These
reports eventually reached members of this group who were not only
researchers, but also experts in regulatory issues: legal academics.
A small panel discussion at the 2004 Association of American Law
Schools Annual Meeting46 led some law professors to begin exploring the
appropriateness of the federal regulations for protecting research subjects.
In particular, the law professors raised the issue of whether the regulations
violate the First Amendment.47 Perhaps the earliest extended work on this
issue is Philip Hamburger’s 2004 article, entitled The New Censorship:
Institutional Review Boards.48
Hamburger argues that “IRB laws
unconstitutionally require licensing of speech and the press but that . . .
doctrines of the U.S. Supreme Court have diminished the clarity of the
Constitution’s obstacles to licensing and thus have emboldened the

44. See id. at 59. For example, “Duke University made a number of changes in the ten
months immediately following the four-day suspension of its authority to conduct research with
human subjects. These changes included: (a) increasing the number of IRBs, from one to two,
and making plans to add at least two more; (b) sponsoring a ninety-minute course on the
regulation and history of medical research with human subjects and requiring that all 1,350
clinical investigators at the medical center take the course; (c) providing up to forty hours of
training for each IRB member; (d) increasing the size of the support staff for its IRBs, from two
full-time positions to 11; and (e) increasing the staff support budget from approximately
$100,000 to about $1 million.” Id.
45. See COMM. A ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM & TENURE, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS,
RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
(2006), at www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/humansubs.htm (last visited May 19, 2008)
[hereinafter AAUP COMM. A] (giving examples of “more or less familiar horror stories” drawn
“from experiences of prospective researchers in a variety of different disciplines in the social
sciences and humanities”).
46. Association of American Law Schools, Section on Law and the Social Sciences 2004
Annual Meeting, Institutional Review Boards and You (Jan. 5, 2004), at
http://aalsweb.aals.org/am2004/programs/details/6360.shtml (last visited May 19, 2008).
47. Id.
48. Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT.
REV. 271 (2004).
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government to impose IRBs and have left academics and universities without
the confidence to resist.”49
Around the same time Hamburger’s article was published, the University
of Illinois Center for Advanced Study took a prominent step to continue the
debate about the IRB system by holding a conference on Human Subject
Protection Regulations and Research Outside the Biomedical Sphere in
2003.50 The conference’s purpose was described as follows:
The invitational conference asked for advance position papers . . .
addressing “When does a person become a human subject?” in order to
analyze more closely who we are seeking to protect, from what, and why.
Some of the questions considered included:
 When a faculty member writes about students and the teaching
process, when is that an “interaction” with human subjects that is or
should be covered by federal research regulations?
 Is it appropriate or a good use of resources for a central institutional
review board to govern the questions to be asked and how records
are kept and used by faculty and graduate students conducting oral
history interviews?
 Why can a journalist working for a newspaper interview and publish
articles and books about sensitive issues, subject only to professional
ethical guidance and legal consequences, while a journalism
professor must additionally seek prior approval from those outside
journalism (i.e., an IRB) for the same activities?
 Is it good public policy to base the regulation of activities involving
humans on where the research is performed (in terms of institutional
affiliation or field setting), rather than on the nature of harm that
might result?
Nationally, these questions and others like them in anthropology, business,
sociology, English, psychology, law, history, education, and journalism,
among other disciplines, have been causing increasing controversy over the
last five to 10 years.51

The Illinois White Paper, the conference’s product, has substantially
impacted the debate about the IRB system. Its executive summary provides
a good statement of a particular viewpoint:

49. Hamburger, supra note 24, at 406 n.6.
50. CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, THE ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER: IMPROVING THE SYSTEM FOR
PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS: COUNTERACTING IRB “MISSION CREEP” 6 (2003), available at
www.law.uiuc.edu/conferences/whitepaper/whitepaper.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008)
[hereinafter ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER].
51. Id.
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Our system of research self-regulation, designed to provide internal checks
and balances for those who participate in research involving human
subjects, is under considerable stress. Study after study recently has
reported that this is a system “in crisis,” “in jeopardy,” and in need of
thoughtful re-examination.
Much of this crisis has been caused by what we call mission creep, in which
the workload of IRBs has expanded beyond their ability to handle effectively.
Mission creep is caused by rewarding wrong behaviors, such as focusing
more on procedures and documentation than difficult ethical questions;
unclear definitions, which lead to unclear responsibilities; efforts to comply
with unwieldy federal requirements even when research is not federally
funded; exaggerated precautions to protect against program shutdowns;
and efforts to protect against lawsuits.
Honest IRB specialists admit that they operate under constant concern about
the one case in a thousand that might slip through review — with the
consequence that the other 999 receive exaggerated reviews and risk
rejection in an effort to err on the side of caution.
As a consequence, mission creep is causing IRBs to lose the respect and
“buy-in” of the very people they are meant to regulate; they are misdirecting
their energies, threatening both academic and first amendment freedoms;
and most importantly, mission creep is taking needed resources from the
most risky research, which truly does need IRB oversight.52

The White Paper presents a number of specific recommendations. First,
it recommends conducting empirical research to gather additional
information, both about “good” and “poor” practices.53 It suggested
developing a “clearing house” that would provide workable solutions to
what might otherwise appear to be inappropriate administrative barriers.54
Second, it recommends refining the existing system to create a set of
regulations that are better tuned to the issues raised by social and
behavioral research.55 Finally, it recommends removing certain endeavors
from IRB review altogether.56 The removed category might include certain
fields, such as journalism and ethnography, and certain methodologies,
such as oral history,57 that “pose virtually no risk to the subjects.”58
In April 2006, the symposium entitled Censorship and Institutional
Review Boards at Northwestern University School of Law brought together a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2, 18.
Id. at 2, 19.
ILLINOIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 50, at 3, 18-19.
Id. at 3, 22.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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wide range of people, including those who were previously involved in
analysis of IRB issues and others who were new to the topic but had a
professional interest in the legal issues it raises.59 The Northwestern
University Law Review published the symposium contributors’ work: nineteen
articles spanning almost five hundred pages.60 The articles address topics
ranging from the specific legal issue of whether the IRB system violates the
First Amendment61 to anecdotal accounts of how IRBs have hindered the
work of researchers.62 Defenders of the current system also presented their
viewpoints.63
The most recent, and perhaps most prominent, report examining IRB
operation was approved in June 2006 by a subcommittee of Committee A
on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP).64 This report, prepared by a truly stellar list of leading
academics,65 begins by noting that the federal regulations “have generated
an increasing number of complaints over the years, and there is a by-now
enormous literature that points to their objectionable features.”66 After
recounting assorted examples of demands IRBs have placed on researchers
that range from silly to absurd, the report evaluates the system and
proposed changes to it and makes a recommendation for policy makers.67
The report states that “[w]hat is deeply troublesome is the fact that research
on human subjects must obtain IRB approval whether or not it imposes a
serious risk of harm on its subjects.”68 While some commentators have
59. James Lindgren et al., Foreword: Symposium on Censorship and Institutional Review
Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (2007), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/issues/101.2.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
60. See Symposium, Censorship and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399
(2007).
61. See Hamburger, supra note 24; James Weinstein, Institutional Review Boards and the
Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 493 (2007); Philip Hamburger, Two-Dimensional Doctrine
and Three-Dimensional Law: A Response to Professor Weinstein, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 563
(2007); James Weinstein, The Dimensions of Constitutional Analysis: A Reply to Professor
Hamburger, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 569 (2007).
62. See, e.g., Fredric L. Coe, The Costs and Benefits of a Well-Intended Parasite: A
Witness and Reporter on the IRB Phenomenon, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 723 (2007).
63. See, e.g., Menikoff, supra note 33; Jonathan Moss, If Institutional Review Boards
Were Declared Unconstitutional, They Would Have to Be Reinvented, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 801
(2007).
64. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45.
65. The report was prepared by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; Catherine Elgin, Harvard Graduate School of Education; David A. Hyman,
University Of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Philip E. Rubin, Yale University School Of
Medicine and Haskins Laboratories. Id.
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id. at 96-98.
68. Id. at 97.
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suggested that all research in the social science and humanities be
exempted from IRB review and that the system be limited to regulating “only
biomedical research,”69 the report’s authors conclude that it would be
inappropriate to make that change for two reasons.70 First, some social
science research has the potential to cause significant psychological harm to
subjects.71 Second, some biomedical research does not have the potential
to cause any serious harm to subjects because it does not consist of bodily
interventions and only requires obtaining survey data.72
Accordingly, the report’s authors conclude that the best reform would
not involve looking at the type of research, but rather at the methodology
used in a study.73 Specifically, the authors conclude that research “whose
methodology consists entirely of collecting data by surveys, conducting
interviews, or observing behavior in public places [should] be exempt from
the requirement of IRB review.”74 They note that the current regulations, in
fact, already exempt such studies from requiring IRB review except under
limited circumstances, but that, currently, a researcher has to file a request
for exemption which must in turn be reviewed and approved by the IRB.75
The report’s authors believe that studies involving these methodologies
should, in effect, be automatically exempted, without any need to obtain
prior approval.76
III. THE PUBLIC HEALTH DILEMMA AND THE DUTIES OF RESEARCHERS TO DISCLOSE
EXISTING RISKS
While all of the discussions were taking place concerning how the IRB
system created inappropriate, and perhaps unconstitutional, burdens on the
conduct of research in the social and behavioral sciences, a seemingly very
different aspect of the system was being debated elsewhere. An appropriate
69. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97.
70. Id.
71. Id. In this context, the report mentions the famous experiment conducted by Stanley
Milgram, where he asked subjects to control a machine that they believed would deliver pain
to people in another room. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97.
75. Id. This claim is not completely correct. Nothing in the regulations requires the filing
of a request for exemption, nor its approval by the IRB. OHRP merely provides guidance that
researchers should not make their own determination of exempt status. Furthermore, even
under OHRP’s guidance, the IRB (or even an IRB member) is not required to make the
determination. Rather, the guidance says that some appropriately trained person other than
the investigator must make the determination. See Office for Protection from Research Risks,
Exempt Research and Research That May Undergo Expedited Review (1995), available at
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/hsdc95-02.htm (last visited May 19, 2008).
76. AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97.
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introduction to this simultaneous debate is an examination of a particular
public health lead paint study that began in inner city Baltimore in the early
1990s.77
At that time, many of the homes in Baltimore’s low-income, high-risk
neighborhoods had paint with high lead content on their walls.78 It was no
longer legal to use such paint, but the costs of fully removing the lead paint
already on walls—often more than the value of the homes—was prohibitive
and the existing public health laws allowed these buildings to be used as
housing, even by families with young children.79 Indeed, poorer families in
inner-city Baltimore often had no choice but to live in such housing.
The Kennedy Krieger Institute, a research organization affiliated with The
Johns Hopkins University, played a major role in earlier years performing
landmark work to uncover the problem of lead poisoning in children.80 The
Institute continued research in that field and, in the early 1990s, began a
study to determine if there might be low-cost methods of reducing the risk to
children of living in lead-contaminated housing.81 The researchers devised
several methods to reduce those risks, each costing between $1,650 and
$7,000, and then conducted a randomized study that assigned homes to
one of the interventions.82 Some families were enrolled by applying the
intervention to the home in which they were already living; others were
enrolled when the researchers applied the interventions to vacant homes
and asked landlords to rent the homes to families with young children.83
Two families who participated in the study sued the Kennedy Krieger
Institute in state court, claiming, among other things, that the researchers

77. See Joanne Pollak, The Lead-Based Paint Abatement Repair & Maintenance Study in
Baltimore: Historic Framework and Study Design, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 89, 96 (2002),
available at www.hopkinsmedicine.org/Press_releases/2004 (follow “Grimes v Kennedy
Krieger Institute: Facts About the KKI Lead Paint Study” hyperlink) (last visited May 19, 2008);
see also Tamar Lewin, U.S. Investigating Johns Hopkins Study of Lead Paint Hazard, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at A11, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405E1D
F1331F937A1575BC0A9679C8B63 (last visited May 19, 2008).
78. KENNEDY-KRIEGER INSTITUTE, LEAD-BASED PAINT STUDY FACT SHEET (2001), at
www.hopkinsmedicine.org/press/2001/SEPTEMBER/leadfactsheet.htm (last visited May 19,
2008) [hereinafter KKI FACT SHEET].
79. Id.
80. Pollak, supra note 77, at 93; Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807,
811-12 (Md. 2001).
81. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78.
82. Id.; see also TECHNICAL PROGRAMS BRANCH, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LEAD-BASED
PAINT ABATEMENT AND REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STUDY IN BALTIMORE: PRE-INTERVENTION
FINDINGS 13, 16 (1996), available at http://epa.gov/oppt/lead/pubs/r95-012.pdf (last visited
May 19, 2008) [hereinafter EPA STUDY] (describing study design and sample collection
procedures).
83. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78; Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813, 821.
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did not obtain appropriate informed consent.84
The case reached
Maryland’s highest state court, which issued a scathing, landmark ruling,
condemning not only the researchers but the IRB system that approved the
study.85 According to the court, this study was shockingly similar to many of
the most shameful studies in history, including the Nazis having exposed
residents in the Buchenwald concentration camp to typhus during World
War II.86 The court included the Tuskegee Study in its list, noting that these
studies all involved the use of especially vulnerable subjects and took
inappropriate advantage of their vulnerabilities.87 In fact, the court’s ruling
went beyond the allegations in the complaint and concluded that it would
not have mattered even if there was appropriate informed consent by the
children’s parents: “[N]o degree of parental consent, and no degree of
furnished information to the parents could make the experiment at issue
here, ethically or legally permissible.”88
The court’s ruling that there was no permissible way to conduct this
study, even if appropriate informed consent was obtained, has received
much criticism. Many have commented that the ruling is inconsistent with
the existing understanding of the acceptable conditions for conducting
research with children. They have also noted that this study was an
important one and relatively low risk, compared to hundreds of other studies
that are regularly allowed to proceed in the United States with little
controversy.89 Thus, the issue of whether this study was somehow “too risky”
to be permissible remains unsettled.
But a very different aspect of the study, and of the court’s opinion, is
highly relevant to the issues discussed in this Article. As noted above, the
plaintiffs’ core claim was the inadequacy of informed consent, and the court
concluded that they stated a claim on that issue and the case should be
allowed to go to trial.90 In deciding that the plaintiffs stated a viable claim,
the court concluded that researchers owe a variety of legal duties to
research subjects because of the special relationship such studies normally

84. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 818.
85. See id. at 813-14, 817.
86. Id. at 816-17.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 857-58.
89. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: Grimes v
Kennedy Krieger Institute, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1070, 1071-72 (2002); Anna C.
Mastroianni & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Risk and Responsibility: Ethics, Grimes v Kennedy Krieger, and
Public Health Research Involving Children, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1073-74 (2002); Efi
Rubinstein, Comment, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review Boards in Protecting
Children Involved in Nontherapeutic Research, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 251, 276-77
(2003).
90. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 832-33.
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create.91 Specifically, the court held that, under Maryland law, researchers
“have a duty to warn [research subjects] regarding dangers present when
the researcher has knowledge of the potential for harm to the subject and
the subject is unaware of the danger[.]”92
An article by two leading health law scholars, Diane Hoffmann and
Karen Rothenberg, analyzes the court’s comments about this duty at
length.93 Hoffmann and Rothenberg argue that, depending on how one
interprets the court’s statements, the court might have been creating a new
duty and one that could have troubling consequences for conducting future
research, including important public health studies.94 At the heart of their
analysis is the distinction between risks that are created by the researchers’
actions and pre-existing risks that subjects were exposed to prior to the
researchers’ involvement and that the researchers do not alter.95 They
acknowledge that researchers are under a duty to inform a proposed
research subject about any risks that are created (or made worse) by
participating in the study.96 This duty is straightforwardly embodied in the
federal regulations’ requirement of disclosure of “any reasonably
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject.”97 No one familiar with
those rules would contend that such risks do not have to be disclosed.
But what about risks that the researchers do not create? In the Grimes
case, the plaintiffs claimed that, among other things, the researchers should
have informed them about the risk of lead exposure to their children from
a risk that the
continuing to live in lead-contaminated housing,98
99
researchers did not create.
Many of the families were already living in
lead-contaminated housing even before the researchers’ involvement, and
nothing the researchers did made the risk of exposure any worse.100 Thus,
the following question arises: Did the researchers have a duty to disclose the
background risk, one that they did not create?

91. Id. at 841-42.
92. Id. at 818-19.
93. See Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The
Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 109, 129-47 (2002) (discussing the effects of such a duty from the perspectives of
research participants as well as researchers).
94. Id. at 110, 130-31, 144-45.
95. Id. at 130.
96. Id. at 130-31.
97. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2007).
98. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 844 (Md. 2001).
99. Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 135.
100. Id.
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As quoted above, the court appears to have concluded that yes, such a
risk does have to be disclosed.101 What is especially interesting is the
conclusion of these two distinguished scholars that the court’s recognition of
such a duty should be considered controversial and a significant expansion
of the duties of a researcher to a subject.102 Thus, under the scholars’ view,
the law prior to this case would have allowed the Kennedy Krieger
researchers to conduct their study and not inform the parents about the
known danger of lead poisoning in children and how continuing to live in
lead-contaminated housing is very unhealthy for children.
Hoffmann and Rothenberg describe other scenarios that would raise
similar ethical issues. For example, a study might involve enrolling members
of a population that “exposes its children to a diet without certain
nutrients.”103 They ask whether the researcher should be “required to tell
the subjects of the risks of such a diet.”104 They discuss a study “on the
effects of second-hand smoke on children living in housing with parents who
smoke” and ask whether it should “be the obligation of the researchers to
inform the parents at the start of the research of the risks to children of
second-hand smoke[.]”105
Not only do Hoffmann and Rothenberg find that the court’s apparent
recognition of a duty to disclose these background risks is a change in the
law, but they also are seriously concerned that it may be a bad change.106
In particular, they are concerned that such a duty may make it harder to
conduct certain types of public health studies.107 They assert that “the real
danger of the Court’s Opinion is the possibility that it will significantly
reduce major public health studies that could be the basis of revising our
public health and environmental laws.”108
IV. THE APPROVABILITY OF MODERN-DAY TUSKEGEES
What do the two themes discussed in Parts II and III tell us about the
ability to conduct a modern-day study that shares some of the core

101. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 852, 858; see also Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at
130. Hoffmann and Rothenberg do note that it is possible to interpret the court’s opinion in a
way that suggests these risks were, indeed, attributable to participation in the study, in which
case the opinion would have been making a narrower claim about the duty to warn. Id. at
129-39.
102. See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 139.
103. Id. at 145.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 146.
107. Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 145-46.
108. Id. at 145.
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characteristics of the Tuskegee Study? Consider the following hypothetical
study, which might be called “Tuskegee Today”:
A researcher proposes to study the natural history of disease X. It is a
relatively rare genetic disease, but it has certain unusual characteristics.
Due to these unusual characteristics, a better understanding of it may be
helpful in learning more about the underlying biomedical mechanisms of
several other more common diseases. A treatment exists that substantially
reduces the otherwise severe and irreversible consequences of disease X.
The researcher has been able to find several groups of black men who have
disease X. They are poorly educated, have limited incomes, and do not
have access to good healthcare. They are not aware that an effective
treatment for disease X exists. The researcher proposes to conduct the study
by having regular interviews with the subjects over a period of several years.
He will obtain written informed consent from the subjects, describing all of
the interviews in which subjects will participate. The researcher does not
plan to voluntarily tell the subjects that disease X has an effective treatment,
though he will not lie to them if they ask about possible treatment options.

Could researchers conduct such a study today and fully comply with the
existing federal rules for protecting research subjects?
Before analyzing the permissibility of Tuskegee Today, it bears
mentioning that this hypothetical does not embody all of the wrongs that
were involved in the actual Tuskegee Syphilis Study. In the actual study, the
researchers actively took steps to ensure that the subjects did not learn
about their disease or the various treatment options.109 Without doubt, the
deceptive aspect of the Tuskegee Study involved an active wrong—the
researchers acted to make the subjects worse off. The researchers,
themselves, imposed a new “risk” on the subjects. Thus, a study-created risk
existed.
But the Tuskegee Study involved another wrong that history seems to
find equally troubling—standing by and allowing the men to live untreated
because they did not know a treatment was available. This consequence
could have occurred even without the researchers actively deceiving or lying
to the subjects. And this element of the study comes through in many
descriptions of its wrongs, even if more detailed facts of the active deception
are not mentioned. Consider the July 26, 1972 Washington Evening Star
headline for the article that first exposed the Tuskegee Study: Human
Guinea Pigs: Syphilis Patients Died Untreated.110 Associated Press reporter
Jean Heller explained that “[f]or 40 years the United States Public Health
109. JONES, supra note 8, at 5; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 14; TUSKEGEE
TIMELINE, supra note 3.
110. Jean Heller, Human Guinea Pigs: Syphilis Patients Died Untreated, WASH. EVENING
STAR, July 25, 1972, at A1.
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Service . . . conducted a study in which human beings with syphilis, who
were induced to serve as guinea pigs, have gone without medical
treatment . . . and a few have died of its late effects, even though an
effective therapy was eventually discovered.”111 Both the headline and that
simple sentence conveyed the core of the wrongdoing that stunned readers.
And this core wrong still would have occurred merely by failing to let the
men know that treatment existed.
So would the Tuskegee Today hypothetical study encounter any
regulatory stop signs under the view of the world discussed earlier in this
Article? Consider, for example, the proposal from the AAUP that would
apply to studies whose methodology consists entirely of collecting data and
conducting interviews.112 The proposed Tuskegee Today study would clearly
comply with the AAUP proposal and, thus, would not require review by
anyone who is part of the IRB system. This outcome takes place largely
because of the main proposition on which the AAUP rules are constructed:
studies that are low risk—meaning that the researchers are not creating a
risk by enrolling the subjects in the study—should not require ethical
review.113 The Tuskegee Today hypothetical does not itself impose any risks
on the subjects. Therefore, it falls squarely within the category of studies the
AAUP proposal exempts from ethical review.
Similarly, when considering the concerns about public health research
raised in the wake of the Kennedy Krieger Institute case, the Tuskegee Today
hypothetical study would likely fall squarely within the parameters that
Hoffmann and Rothenberg propose to address such concerns. Hoffmann
and Rothenberg contend that, at the least, it is “unclear” whether
researchers have any duty to disclose risks that they do not create.114 They
worry that creating such a duty, if it does not exist, might have a negative
effect.115 In the Tuskegee Today hypothetical, no risks would indeed be
created by the researchers, and so Hoffmann and Rothenberg’s discussion
would, at the least, lead to some doubt about the existence of a duty for the
researchers to give the subjects any information about disease X, including
that an effective treatment exists.
And lest the reader think that surely no one would try to apply these
themes to allow a new version of the Tuskegee Study to take place—that if
that fact pattern were raised, arguments would be made to ensure that such
a proposed study receives appropriate review—there is direct evidence
suggesting that this is not the case. For example, leading IRB critic Philip

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97.
See id. at 97-98.
Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 143-44, 147.
Id. at 144-47.
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Hamburger directly addresses some aspects of what happened in the actual
Tuskegee Syphilis Study in his Northwestern University School of Law
Symposium article.116
In critiquing The Belmont Report, which, as discussed above, laid the
foundation for much of the current federal regulations,117 Hamburger
concludes that it perpetuated a misunderstanding of “what was wrong about
the Tuskegee Study.”118 His analysis, addressing issues similar to those
raised in Part III above, explains that The Belmont Report’s analysis of the
duties owed by researchers to subjects was mistaken.
The Belmont Report’s version of Tuskegee raises questions as to whether the
researchers there violated any duty to their subjects. . . . Of course, if it is
recognized that the researchers were doctors and others who held
themselves out as offering health care, then the breach of a Hippocratic and
fiduciary duty is obvious. The Belmont Report, however, overgeneralizes
about Tuskegee in terms of a general duty of researchers, and it thus leaves
room for doubts as to what went wrong there.119

Under Hamburger’s analysis, then, the primary wrong in the Tuskegee Study
was due to the fact that the researchers were doctors and were violating the
duties that they, as doctors, owed to patients.120 Thus, had the study been
conducted by non-clinicians, such as PhDs who were experts in public
health, presumably there would have been no similar duties owed to the
research subjects flowing from their role as researchers. This basis for the
duties owed turns the wrongs committed in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study into
mainly an issue of having chosen the wrong people to conduct the study.
According to Hamburger’s viewpoint, it is a serious mistake to conclude that
researchers owe a wide range of duties to subjects, particularly any that
might fall under the category of “fiduciary” duties.121 Only professionals
116. Hamburger, supra note 24, at 405.
117. See supra text accompanying note 20.
118. Hamburger, supra note 24, at 458.
119. Id. Hamburger further notes that recently there have been articles revisiting what
happened in the Tuskegee Study and concluding that, in fact, it may not have been as
shameful as many portray it. Id. at 458 n.139. One of the scholars whose work he cites is
Richard Shweder, a University of Chicago professor who has also been an active critic of the
IRB system. Id. at 458 n.139 (citing Richard A. Shweder, Tuskegee Re-Examined: A Cultural
Anthropologist Offers a Counter-Narrative to the Infamous Story of U.S. Government Scientists
Allowing Black Men to Suffer from Untreated Syphilis, SPIKED, Jan. 8, 2004, at www.spikedonline.com/Articles/0000000CA34A.htm (last visited May 19, 2008)).
120. Hamburger, supra note 24, at 453-59. Hamburger similarly analyzes what
happened to the concentration camp victims at the hands of the Nazis, noting that their
captors already owed them duties that have traditionally been recognized as owed by a
government to people under its control, and, thus, there was no need to create a new
fiduciary duty owed by a researcher to a subject. Id. at 456-57.
121. See id. at 452-59.
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such as physicians and attorneys have such duties, and, he notes,
“[r]esearchers are not professionals.”122
The Tuskegee Today hypothetical study raises, at the least, two
important questions: First, could it be conducted without violating the
existing rules for protecting research subjects? Second, regardless of its
status under the current rules, should society allow such a study to be
conducted? Both questions can be answered with a reasonable degree of
certainty.
A.

Could Tuskegee Today be conducted without violating the existing rules
for protecting research subjects?

The history of the current rules recounted above provides a solid
argument for concluding that the Tuskegee Today hypothetical study would
violate current protections for human research subjects. Admittedly, the
wording of the federal regulations requiring the disclosure of “reasonably
foreseeable risks”123 certainly suggests that this provision is mainly referring
to risks created by a person’s participation in a study. However, we are not
interpreting this provision in a vacuum. We must remember that what
happened in the original Tuskegee Study was one of the motivating forces
that led to the current rules.
As noted above, there are revisionist analyses of the events in the
Tuskegee Study that suggest that what happened was not as shameful as is
generally claimed.124 But those analyses remain minority viewpoints. The
Tuskegee Syphilis Study likely still stands out as the research study in the
United States that deserves the distinction of most “shameful.”125 Its legacy
is not merely the current rules, but a persisting wariness among many
African-Americans about whether they will be treated fairly by the medical
system.126 A current demonstration of its continuing impact is the wide
interest and debate generated by Harriet Washington’s recent book,
Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black
Americans from Colonial Times to the Present.127
While there certainly can be a debate about the outer limits of a
researcher’s duty to disclose to subjects risks not created by the researchers,
surely that duty is embodied in the current regulations when (1) the

122. Id. at 452.
123. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2007).
124. See supra notes 116 to 122 and accompanying text.
125. See Presidential Apology, supra note 2 (describing the Tuskegee Study and what the
U.S. Government did as “shameful”).
126. See id.; see also HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2006).
127. WASHINGTON, supra note 126.
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undisclosed risks relate to the very disease the researchers are studying, and
(2) there would be substantial harms to the subjects from being kept
ignorant of those facts.
There is a word that every first year law student learns in studying
contracts law, a word that provides an appropriate description of what it
would mean to watch these men become sicker and sicker and withhold
from them the single piece of information that could prevent that from
happening: unconscionable. Unconscionable contracts are those that
shock the conscience.128 The relationships created in research studies do,
to some extent, involve contract-like elements, as courts are beginning to
recognize.129 They involve voluntary agreements entered into by researchers
and subjects, describing the terms of what will happen during a research
study.130 However, as with all contracts, there are limits to what society will
accept in a very one-sided agreement.
What happened in the original Tuskegee Study did indeed shock people
when it was finally made public in 1972. There is little reason to think that
society has changed to so great an extent that such behavior would be less
shocking to a modern-day audience. Moreover, there is no reason to think
that the shocking elements of the Tuskegee Study were confined to the
intentional lies made to the subjects.131 Now that we have taken great steps
to protect research subjects, and are proud of those protections, presumably
we should be far less tolerant of behaviors by researchers that appear
questionable.
The core protection that the federal regulations afford research subjects
is informed consent.132 Something would be very wrong if we interpreted
the limits of that protection to allow people to participate in a study where
the researchers are, in essence, shamefully exploiting the subjects’
ignorance. Many aspects of modern research are troubling, including the
fact that much of what we learn, we often learn from people who are in
unfortunate circumstances. For example, people may enroll in studies
because they are poor and cannot afford healthcare. By participating in the
study they may receive treatments that they could not otherwise access.
But however troubling other aspects of the research system may be, it is
especially troubling, given the system’s emphasis on the protections of
informed consent, to allow a study’s key element to rely on withholding a
simple but critically important piece of information. That circumstance
would indeed be unconscionable and it is hard to believe that any current

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 75, 1561 (8th ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843 (Md. 2001).
See id. at 843-44.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007).
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IRB would ever approve such a study. A current IRB would recognize that, in
at least some circumstances, the federal regulations, consistent with the
lessons of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study that helped shape them, do require
researchers to disclose risks beyond those the researchers create themselves.
B.

Should our rules allow Tuskegee Today to be conducted?

In evaluating whether our rules should allow researchers to conduct a
study such as the Tuskegee Today hypothetical, we must first comment on
the law of unintended consequences. Much of the current debate about
reforming the IRB system, and eliminating administrative reviews that do little
to protect subjects, supposes that society should only care about those risks
that are imposed on subjects by participation in a study. For example, this
supposition is the central premise of the AAUP’s proposed reforms.133
However, as this Article has demonstrated, the roots of our system for
protecting human subjects actually lie in studies where some of the most
troubling aspects were due not to risks the researchers imposed, but rather
to failure to disclose information about other risks not created by the study.
There is no reason to believe that those concerns, and the reasons why we
condemned such behaviors decades ago, have gone away. Thus, we need
to be wary of looking solely at the risks caused by participation in a study
and concluding that when such risks are minimal, a study is minimal risk
and, thus, requires no ethical review. Some of the reformers might have
inadvertently missed these types of concerns. If these concerns were brought
to their attention, they might well modify their proposed reforms to provide
appropriate protections.
Others, however, are raising the issue squarely but argue that by
imposing certain disclosure duties on researchers, the government makes it
harder to conduct some types of research, including studies that might have
a substantial impact on public health.134 The first response to this
proposition should be to ask, where is the empirical evidence that such
disclosure duties will indeed substantially deter research?
An excellent example for evaluating this issue is the Kennedy Krieger
Institute lead paint study. While the consent forms used in the study were far
from ideal, they did provide information about the risks of lead poisoning in
children.135 Furthermore, there is little reason to think that if that
information had been provided more clearly it would have significantly
altered the enrollment of families in the study. After all, the reason the
researchers conducted the study in the first place was that lead

133. See AAUP COMM. A, supra note 45, at 97-98.
134. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 146.
135. Pollak, supra note 77, at 102; see also KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78.
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contamination was endemic in inner-city Baltimore homes.136 Low-income
parents had few choices other than to live in these homes.137 The
underlying problem being studied had nothing to do with lack of
information. Rather, it was caused by the lack of money needed to remove
the lead.138
Thus, a family that was told the full details about the consequences of
lead poisoning had no reason to change its behaviors. Additionally, there is
no reason to think that public health officials had been hiding the lead paint
problem from Baltimore residents or that such residents were especially
poorly informed about it. The ultimate problem—and a very difficult one—
was that these residents had few other affordable choices for housing.
Therefore, full disclosure about the hazards of lead poisoning would have
had little impact on the study.
On the other hand, failing to impose a disclosure duty on researchers
could have a major, even crippling, consequence on public health and
other research. The concerns raised about the Kennedy Krieger Institute
lead paint study, including claims that the researchers were trying to take
advantage of the parents’ ignorance about lead poisoning,139 demonstrate
how public outrage about researcher behavior may lead to a backlash that
ultimately shuts down critically important studies.
Another very prominent example of this phenomenon is the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) attempt to study the health effects
on children of home pesticide use. In 2004, the EPA designed an
observational study called the Children’s Environmental Exposure Research
Study (CHEERS), which would have involved families with young children
that were using substantial amounts of pesticides in their homes.140 Scant
information is available about whether currently available home pesticides
might be causing medical problems in children.141 This study aimed to
produce that information.142
136. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78; see also Pollak, supra note 77, at 92.
137. KKI FACT SHEET, supra note 78.
138. Id.
139. See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 93, at 143 (citing Brief for Appellants at 9,
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 809 (Md. 2001) (No. 1177)).
140. NAT’L EXPOSURE RESEARCH LAB., FACT SHEET: A CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE
RESEARCH STUDY – CHEERS 1 (2004), available at www.fluoridealert.org/pesticides/cheers/
cheers.epa.nov.8.04.facts.pdf (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter CHEERS FACT SHEET];
see also Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement by Stephen L. Johnson, Acting
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 8, 2005), at www.epa.gov/
cheers/ (last visited May 19, 2008) [hereinafter EPA Statement].
141. Jerry Menikoff, Human Subject Testing: Of Babies, Bugs, and Bombast: A Look Behind
the Crash-and-Burn of the CHEERS Pesticide Study, 4 MED. RES. L. & POL’Y REP. (BNA) 586
(July 20, 2005).
142. Id.
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The study became a political hot potato, embroiled in complicated
claims and counterclaims, as Senate Democrats attacked it for
inappropriately exposing young children to pesticide risks.143 Ultimately, in
order to gain Senate confirmation of the nominee for the EPA permanent
administrator, the EPA agreed not to conduct the study.144 What is
especially interesting was the resonance this political in-fighting generated
among various segments of the public, including certain religious groups,
who vocally condemned the study.145 Even the usually staid New York Times
editorialized that the study was “macabre.”146
Two issues this debate raised were whether the researchers would inform
parents of the known risks of pesticide use, and, if they saw parents
incorrectly using pesticides, whether they would inform the parents of the
misuse.147 The EPA indicated that it only wanted to study the “correct” use
of pesticides and that it would inform parents about the known hazards from
pesticide use and correcting misuse.148
However, as noted, even with these clarifications, the study was so
controversial that it never took place.149 Imagine the uproar if the EPA had
tried to follow the approach outlined in Parts II and III of this Article under
which researchers have no duty to disclose risks they do not impose
themselves. If the New York Times characterized the study as “macabre”
before, what headlines might it write about a study in which EPA researchers
observe parents misusing pesticides, expose children to such misuse, and
take no action, relying on their “lack of a duty” to do anything?
Or consider the hypothetical study that Hoffmann and Rothenberg
propose where researchers want to study a population that uses a diet that
exposes its children to certain nutritional deficiencies. Imagine, for example,
that children on this diet are suspected to have a high incidence of heart
failure in the teen years. What would the societal reaction be to learning
that researchers stood by and conducted this study without even letting the
parents and children know about these concerns?
V. CONCLUSION
The current IRB system is far from perfect, and there are many
appropriate reforms that the government should make to ensure that it
minimizes wasted effort and does not create unnecessary barriers to the

143.
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147.
148.
149.
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Id.
Id.
Editorial, The Worst of the Bad Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at A26.
Menikoff, supra note 141.
CHEERS FACT SHEET, supra note 140, at 3.
EPA Statement, supra note 140.
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conduct of research. However, in making those reforms, society needs to
recognize that researchers owe important basic duties to research subjects
that require them to disclose information about certain risks, even if the risks
are not created by the researchers or preexisted the study.
These basic duties reflect the core value of decent behavior that society
expects from researchers. The researchers breached these duties in the
Tuskegee Study, resulting in appropriate public condemnation. As President
Clinton asserted, in the Tuskegee Study, our “nation broke the trust with our
people that is the very foundation of our democracy.”150 We need to be
careful that decades later we do not somehow lose sight of these basic
disclosure duties in the race to make conducting research more efficient.

150. Presidential Apology, supra note 2.
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